This paper addresses the question \why and how is it that we s a y the same thing dierently to dierent people, or even to the same person in dierent circumstances?" We v ary the content and form of our text in order to convey more information t h a n i s c o n tained in the literal meanings of our words. This information expresses the speaker's interpersonal goals toward the hearer and, in general, his or her perception of the pragmatic aspects of the conversation. This paper discusses two insights that arise when one studies this question: the existence of a level of organization that mediates between communicative goals and generator decisions, and the interleaved planning-realization regime and associated monitoring required for generation. To illustrate these ideas, a computer program is described which c o n tains plans and strategies to produce stylistically appropriate texts from a single representation under various settings that model pragmatic circumstances.
New York Times
Unfortunately, with this simplistic view of generation, generators are not sensitive t o a n ything but the input items, and therefore produce the same output to all hearers in all circumstances. However, when we produce language, we tailor our text to the hearer and to the situation. This enables us to include more information than is contained in the literal meanings of our words; indeed, the additional information often has a stronger eect on the hearer than the literal content has. This information is carried by both the content and the form of the text. As speakers and hearers, from various ways of expressing a single underlying conceptualization, we m a k e v arious interpretations of the speaker, his or her goals, the hearer, and the conversational circumstances. These interpretations are governed by rules. Speakers use the rules to determine how t o s a y what they want t o s a y. Generator programs with any real exibility of expression require such rules too.
What types of additional information can speakers convey? Consider the dierences evident in the speaker's point of view in the following four descriptions of an event that occurred at Yale University in April 1986: 1.
[sic]
(From: protester literature; the protesters renamed the plaza after the South African churchman Allan Boesak) 2.
(Speaker: anti-divestment student) 3.
(From:
, S u n d a y, 27 April, 1986, Connecticut section) 2 \On April 4, concerned Yale students constructed a shantytown on Boesak Plaza as a reminder to those in Woodbridge Hall (and all over campus and the community) that Yale is complicit with the system of apartheid that creates shantytowns where thousands of blacks are forced to live in squalor and fear. The shantytown, Winnie Mandela City, served as a focal point o f education concerning South Africa and Yale's investments there. At 5 : 3 0 a m o n A p r i l 1 4 t h e Y ale Administration had the shantytown torn down and had 76 students and community m e m bers who were defending the shanties arrested. After a huge outcry, the Administration allowed the shanties to be rebuilt. We will not be silenced; we will continue to challenge the University o n their moral failure."
\On April 4, a small group of students took over Beinecke Plaza and built some shanties; they wanted to force Yale to sell its stocks in companies with branches located in South Africa. The university asked the students to move the shanties to another location, but the students refused. The university then granted them permission to occupy the plaza until the end of the week, so that they could be there to be seen by the university's trustees, the Yale Corporation, at their meeting. But even after the meeting, the students refused to leave the plaza, and police had to clear the shanties. Later, the university relented, and gave them permission to rebuild the shanties. It also announced that it would send a fact-nding mission to South Africa." \On April 4, students at Yale built a symbolic shantytown to protest their school's investments in companies doing business in South Africa. The college ordered the shanties destroyed. The police arrested 76 protesters when the shantytown was torn down. Local politicians and more than 100 faculty members criticized the action. A week after it had ordered the removal of the shantytown { named Winnie Mandela City, after the South African foe of apartheid { the shantytown was reconstructed and the administration agreed to allow it to remain standing. Concurrently, Y ale announced that its trustees, the Yale Corporation, would soon send a fact-nding mission to South Africa to investigate the actions of corporations in which i t o wns between $350 million and $400 million of stock." pragmatic syntactic rhetorical 1.2 What was Learned from This Work \Some students erected a shantytown to protest Yale's investments in companies that have o p e rations in South Africa. The University t o r e i t d o wn and arrested several of them. The students continued to demonstrate and nally the university said they could put up the shantytown again. The university said it would investigate its investments in South Africa." 4.
(Speaker: neutral student)
Clearly, the rst two s p e a k ers incorporate strongly their opinions about the shantytown issue; the second two speakers seem more neutral but dier in level of formality. In order for generator programs to produce similarly varied, information-bearing text, such programs must have some means of representing relevant c haracteristics of the hearer, the conversation setting, and their interpersonal goals. These are the concerns. In addition, they must contain choice points in the grammar that enable topics to be said in various ways. These are the concerns. Finally, they require criteria by which t o make the decisions so that the choices accurately reect the pragmatic aspects and convey appropriate additional information. These are called here the concerns.
This paper describes how the program PAULINE (Planning And Uttering Language In Natural Environments) produces stylistically appropriate texts from a single story representation under various settings that model pragmatic circumstances.
PAULINE addresses simultaneously a wider range of problems than has been tried in any single language generation program before (with the possible exception of [Clippinger 74]) . It contains about 12,000 lines of Lisp code, and produces some of the most sophisticated text ever generated by computer. As is to be expected, no part of PAULINE provides a satisfactorily detailed solution to any problem; to a larger or smaller degree, each of the questions it addresses is solved by a set of simplied, somewhat ad hoc methods. In fact, some methods have been studied in much greater detail by other NLP researchers. Others remain as projects for the future.
However, this does not invalidate the content o f t h e w ork. This research u n c o vered two principal insights about the nature of language generation that do not depend directly on the details; they will hold for any language generator sophisticated enough to try to achieve a n umber of communicative goals in a single text. While the details of any particular module will not be defended too hard, nor even the exact extent of each module, the following will be defended to the end: the existence of a level of organization mediating between communicative goals and generator decisions, containing entities called here rhetorical goals; and the monitoring of the modules' operation in an interleaved planning-realization regime. The lessons learned here are going to apply to any large and complex enough generator | human or computer.
Example 4. Ocial Yale literature
Time:
Depth of acquaintance: Tone of interaction:
Goal to aect hearer's opinions: Speaker's opinions: much strangers formal switch for university This paper has the following structure: Starting below, the rst principal nding of this work is outlined: any generation system sophisticated enough to operate in service of communicative goals will have to maintain an intermediate level of goals and strategies, called here rhetorical goals. To illustrate this, the program's pragmatic settings and syntactic choices are described, followed by a description of the way these must be linked using the rhetorical goals. Next, the second principal lesson is described: any generation program exible enough to operate under a number of communicative goals (including possibly inconsistent ones) simultaneously will have to monitor the eects of its individual utterance components under an interleaved planning-realization regime. This description includes a brief overview of PAULINE. Finally follow descriptions of three rhetorical goals, their associated strategies, and the ways they aect the text. IN ORDER TO FORCE THE UNIVERSITY TO DIVEST FROM THOSE COMPANIES.  YALE REQUESTED THAT THE STUDENTS ERECT IT ELSEWHERE, BUT THEY  REFUSED TO LEAVE. THE UNIVERSITY INTENDED TO BE REASONABLE. THE  UNIVERSITY GAVE IT PERMISSION TO EXIST UNTIL THE MEETING OF THE  YALE CORPORATION, BUT EVEN AFTER THAT THE STUDENTS STILL REFUSED  TO MOVE. AT 5:30 AM ON APRIL 14, OFFICIALS HAD TO DISASSEMBLE  THE SHANTYTOWN. FINALLY, YALE, BEING CONCILIATORY TOWARD THE  STUDENTS, NOT ONLY PERMITTED THEM TO RECONSTRUCT IT, BUT ALSO  ANNOUNCED THAT A COMMISSION WOULD GO TO SOUTH AFRICA IN JULY TO  EXAMINE THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID. ? request inform of want 2.1 What is Pragmatics?
Incorporating Pragmatics in a Generator
Before representing the shantytown aair, I collected newspaper articles, protester and university literature, descriptions from fellow-students, etc., to see what was typically said. The question then arose: how could one get a generator to produce such a v ariety of paragraphs? It seemed fairly clear that with language one communicates more than simply the factual information | one also conveys interpersonal information, and the text reects one's goals and internal state, the eects one wishes to have on the audience, and the situation and medium of communication.
On the subject of \pragmatics", which deals with these questions, there is a great deal of literature, little of it specic enough to be of much use in a computer program. Even dening what pragmatics is, or whether it is distinct from semantics at all, is still a hotly debated topic (see [Levinson 83, Carnap 38 The AI natural language processing research that has taken pragmatics into account concentrated mainly on generation (pragmatics in parsing is a wide open problem); of this, most work has been done not on the general ways in which pragmatic information can be conveyed, but on specic individual types of pragmatic information used by s p e a k ers. Cohen [Cohen 78] studied the eect of the hearer's knowledge on the selection of appropriate speech act (say, vs ). Appelt [Appelt 85 ] described reasoning about the hearer's knowledge in order to plan the inclusion and organization of topics. The eect of hearer knowledge on user instruction and on object description is described in [Woolf and McDonald 84, Paris 87] respectively; the explanation generator of [Swartout 81 ] had a switch distinguishing between two t ypes of hearer knowledge (either programmer or medical expert). [Jameson 87] describes a program that selects appropriate utterances in job interview situations. Bienkowski describes automatic elaboration of basic text in [Bienkowski 86 ]. [McCoy 8 5 ] discusses perspective selection. Much related work on the structure of discourse uses some pragmatic information, such as the work of Grosz and Sidner [Grosz and Sidner 85, Grosz 86]. Mann and Matthiessen's systemic generator Penman [Mann 83 , M a n n 8 3 ] c o n tains a number of oracles that would be based on pragmatic criteria. Clippinger's program [Clippinger 74] contained a module that reasoned about the pragmatic eects of its generation goals.
A n umber of general classications of speaker intent h a ve b e e n m a d e b y AI researchers. A v ery general discussion of speaker goals is given by [Bruce et al. 78] . Goals are used in [Johnson and Robertson 81] t o m o d e l a s p e a k er having a conversation. In [Schank et al. 81] , Schank and some students analyze the dierent s p e a k er intents underlying a statement. Other goal classications can be found in [Carbonell 78, ] Assuming that generation is inuenced by pragmatic features of this kind, the question is: how? To answer this, we m ust consider what the generation process itself involves.
Any system that produces a sentence must perform a large number of tasks, each w i t h c haracteristic decisions. These decisions range from having relatively wide-range syntactic eect, such as the selection of sentence themes (hereafter called ) and their organization into phrases and sentences, to having relatively localized eect such a s w ord choice:
for a given topic, collect its aspects and related items as candidate topics for other sentences nd appropriate groupings and interpretations of the candidate topics; nd appropriate ways to juxtapose them in multi-predicate phrases; nd ways of expressing relationships among them for each topic, select an appropriate subject, pre-sentence adjunct groups (adverbials, circumstantials, etc.), verb, predicate constituents, etc., and order them determine and order the contents of adjunct groups and noun groups within sentences Whatever the nature of the generator and the implementation of the grammar, all generators have to perform these tasks. The simplest programs perform them by h a ving only one available option. However, as soon as a generator is given the ability to realize a topic in more than one way, it has to be able to make i t s c hoice in a principled manner. Since dierent realizations carry dierent pragmatic eects, the pragmatic aspects of conversations help determine the speaker's text by inuencing the generator's decisions.
This argument seems plausible but runs into problems. Inevitably, attempts to write down rules that relate pragmatic aspects to generator production decisions become bogged down in minutiae a n d produce rules with very little credibility. F or example, how can one determine sentence length from such features as listed above? What syntactic eects are manifested when the speaker is socially dominant over the hearer? Does the speaker's goal to be friendly have a n y bearing on active vs passive s e n tences? Most pragmatic aspects do not inuence the decisions directly, since they are simply too general to be attuned to the requirements of language production.
The solution proposed here is that speakers use a number of goals and associated strategies that act as intermediaries between, on the one hand, the speaker's interpersonal goals and perception of other pragmatic aspects of the conversation, and, on the other, the syntactic decisions the realization component has to make. The claim is that any generation system sophisticated enough to be controlled by c o m m unicative goals similar to those listed above and that has to make syntactic decisions sensitive to those goals will have to incorporate some such i n termediate level of description. These goals will be called . T w o groups of strategies they control are presented here: the strategies of opinion and the strategies of style.
achieve their results by a n umb e r o f t e c hniques, such as judicious topic collection, the appropriate juxtaposition of topics into phrases, the inclusion of stress words, adjectives, and adverbs, and the use of slanted words. These goals are described in section 6.
achieve their results by causing characteristic stylistic eects in the text. Through style, the speaker can communicate additional information that the hearer can interpret and respond to. Classifying all the possible styles of text is an impossible task: one can imagine text characteristics that t almost any adjective! But certain features of text, such as formality a n d force, are generally accepted as stylistic. A study of some of the major handbooks of good writ- Unfortunately, such a descriptive approach i s o f v ery little use in a theory of language production, since it never makes clear why a n d h o w each s t yle is formed out of words; nor does it indicate any systematicity behind the classication of styles. In contrast to such descriptions, a functional approach is to describe styles in terms of the decisions a generator has to make (as listed above). Certain types of decisions group together and form stylistically coherent text, and other types, when grouped, (four values): Being arrogant, respectful, neutral, or cajoling.
Of course, it is impossible to list all possible styles. Every speaker has an idiosyncratic set of techniques, often tailored to particular hearers, for using language to achieve his or her interpersonal goals. Thus, this work should not be interpreted as claiming to describe exhaustively any language user's stylistic knowledge. Rather, it is intended as a description of the general in a generator | the expression of rhetorical goals, which i n t u r n s e r v e the speaker's general communicative goals in the text; and of a useful | as constraints on the decisions the generator has to make.
Having introduced the link between rhetorical goals and generator decisions, the question remains: what is the relation between rhetorical goals and the pragmatic aspects of communication? Sophisticated multifunctional generation would be simple if a one-to-one correspondence existed between rhetorical and pragmatic goals. In this case, each rhetorical goal would simply be the repository for the generatorspecic knowledge required to express its pragmatic partner: for example, the goal to cheer up the hearer would result in happy text, regardless of what other pragmatic conditions held for the conversation. Then there would be no reason for the separate existence of rhetorical goals. However, the pragmatic aspects of conversations are not independent, and this fact necessitates the existence of rhetorical goals Rhetorical goals, then, are the ways the speaker's pragmatic goals can index to (and can determine the application of) his or her stylistic and opinion-manipulative techniques, which c o n trol the decisions of the realization process. The advantages of dening and using rhetorical goals are that they enable one to make explicit, collect, and organize many generator strategies and design characteristics that most generators have left implicit or have a voided altogether.
The last three sections of the paper discuss the rhetorical goals , a n d . Others are described in [Hovy 88 ].
This section briey describes the second principal insight uncovered by t h e d e v elopment o f P AULINE. Any generation system that is controlled by a n umber of communicative goals simultaneously will have to operate under an execution-monitoring regime to orchestrate the harmonious execution of the various plans and strategies needed to produce text. This requirement springs from the diverse nature of the communicative goals underlying generation: some goals can be explicitly planned for, achieved, and forgotten, while other goals, those for which no plans can be formulated, require intermittent satisfaction throughout the text. Plans for the former type of goal usually mandate long ranges of text, while strategies for the latter act over short (typically, single word) ranges of text, usually as a selection from some number of alternatives. The former type of planning, called here top-down or prescriptive planning, has been studied extensively in the AI planning community; the latter type of planning, called here restrictive planning, has only lately started to emerge.
Our current understanding of language generation includes two phases: text planning and text realization. In some generation work, no text planning ever occured: [Simmons and Slocum 72, Goldman 75, Jacobs 85, Danlos 85, Patten 88] . In other work, no serious attention was given to realization (such a s Cohen's work on selecting appropriate speech a c t s [ C o h e n 7 8 ]). The issue of interaction between planning and production phases has been addressed in two principal ways. With the approach, planning and generation is one continuous process: the plannerrealizer handles syntactic constraints the same way it treats treats all other constraints (such as focus or lack of requisite hearer knowledge), the only dierence being that syntactic constraints tend to appear late in the planning-realization process. Typically, the generator is written as a hierarchical expansion planner (see [Sacerdoti 77] Neither approach is satisfactory. Though conceptually more attractive, the integrated approach makes the grammar u n wieldy (it is spread throughout the plan library) and is slow and impractical | after all, the realization process proper is not a planning task | and furthermore, it is not clear whether one could formulate all text planning and realization tasks in a suciently homogeneous set of terms to be handled by a single planner. On the other hand, the separated approach t ypically suers from the stricture of a one-way narrow-bandwidth interface; such a planner could never take i n to account fortuitous syntactic opportunities | or even be awa r e o f a n y s y n tactic notion! Though the separation permits the use of dierent representations for the planning and realization tasks, this solution is hardly better: once the planning stage is over, the realizer has no more recourse to it; if the realizer is able to fulll more than one planner instructions at once, or if it is unable to fulll an instruction, it has no way to bring about any replanning. Therefore, in practice, separated generators perform only planning that has little or no syntactic import | usually, the tasks of topic choice and sentence order. Furthermore, both these models both run counter to human behavior: When we speak, we do not try to satisfy only one or two goals, and we operate (often, and with success) with conicting goals for which no resolution exists. We usually begin to speak before we h a ve planned out the full utterance, and then proceed while performing certain planning tasks in bottom-up fashion.
A better solution is to perform planning | to defer planning until necessitated by the realization process. The planner need assemble only a partial set of generator instructions | enough for the realization component to start working on | and can then continue planning when the realization component requires further guidance. This approach i n terleaves planning and realization and is characterized by a t wo-way c o m m unication at the realizer's decision points. The advantages are: First, it allows the separation of planning and realization tasks, enabling them to be handled in appropriate terms. (In fact, it even allows the separation of special-purpose planning tasks with idiosyncratic representational requirements to be accommodated in special-purpose planners.) Second, it allows planning to take i n to account unexpected syntactic opportunities and inadequacies. Third, this approach accords well with the psycholinguistic research of [Osgood and Bock 7 7 , Rosenberg 77, Danks 77, De Smedt and Kempen 87, Kempen 77, Levelt and Schriefers 87] . This is the approach taken in PAULINE.
But there is a cost to this interleaving: the type of planning typically activated by the realizer diers from traditional top-down planning. There are three reasons for this: 1. Top-down planning > > high low haste simplicity prescriptive restrictive for with 3.3 Planning Restrictively: Monitoring is prescriptive: it determines a series of actions over an extended range of text. However, when the planner cannot expand its plan to the nal level of detail | remember, it doesn't have access to syntactic information | then it has to complete its task by planning in-line, during realization. After in-line planning culminates in a decision, realization processing continues until the next unprovided-for decision point. Unfortunately, unlike standard plan steps, the options at this point need not work toward the same goal as before! In an in-line planning regime, subsequent planning decisions need not have a n y relation with each other, nor any c o m m on goal. The planner has no way t o g u e s s e v en remotely what the next set of options and satisable goals might b e .
2. In-line planning is dierent for a second reason: it is impossible to formulate workable plans for common speaker goals such as pragmatic goals. A speaker may, for example, have the goals to impress the hearer, to make the hearer feel socially subordinate, and yet to be relatively informal. These goals play as large a role in generation as the speaker's goal to inform the hearer about the topic. However, they cannot be achieved by constructing and following a top-down plan | what would the plan's steps prescribe? Certainly not the sentence \I want to impress you, but still make y ou feel subordinate"! Pragmatic eects are best achieved by making appropriate subtle decisions during the generation process: an extra adjective here, a slanted verb there. Typically, this is a matter of in-line planning.
3. A third dierence from traditional planning is the following: Some goals can be achieved, ushed from the goal list, and forgotten. Such goals (for example, the goal to communicate a certain set of topics) usually activate prescriptive plans. In contrast, other goals cannot ever be fully achieved. If you are formal, y ou are formal throughout the text; if you want t o b e f r i e n d l y , arrogant, or opinionated, you remain so | you cannot suddenly become \friendly enough" and then ush that goal. These goals, which are pragmatic and stylistic in nature, are well suited to in-line planning.
Generation, then, requires two t ypes of planning. Certain tasks are most easily performed in topdown fashion (that is, under guidance of a hierarchical planner, or of a schema or script applier), and other tasks are most naturally performed in a bottom-up, selective, fashion. That is, some tasks are | they act over and give shape to long ranges of text | and some are | they act over short ranges of text, usually as a selection from some number of alternatives. Prescriptive strategies are formative: they control the construction and placement of parts in the paragraph and the sentence; that is, they make some commitment to the nal form of the text (such as, for example, the inclusion and order of specic sentence topics). Restrictive strategies are selective: they decide among alternatives that were left open (such as, for example, the possibility of including additional topics under certain conditions, or the specic form of each sentence). A restrictive planner cannot simply plan , it is constrained to plan : the options it has to select from are presented to it by the realizer.
Restrictive planning is most appropriate for handling conicting goals. In generation, situations such as the following are typical: checking, updating, and recording the current satisfaction status of each goal determining which goal(s) each option will help satisfy, to what extent , a n d i n w h a t w ays determining which goal(s) each option will thwart, to what extent, and in what ways computing the relative priority o f e a c h goal in order to resolve conicts (to decide, say, whether during instruction to change the topic or to wait for a socially dominant hearer to change it)
When the planner is uncertain about which long-term goals to pursue and which sequence of actions to select, the following strategies (the rst three of which are from [Durfee and Lesser 86]) are useful: prefer goals (subgoals shared by v arious goals) prefer goals (more easily achieved goals prefer goals (goals that most eectively indicate the long-term promise of the avenue being explored) prefer goals (goals furthest from achievement) prefer goals (goals least recently advanced) use a strategies (a goal receives higher priority the longer it waits and the fewer times it has been advanced) This aspect of generation | goal conict resolution, monitoring, the recognition and repair of mistakes | is a result of the dynamic interplay of goals and opportunities of expression. It arises only upon consideration of a number of communicative goals simultaneously seeking to direct the generation process. This issue be addressed by a n y sophisticated generator.
Prescriptive planning is mostly performed during topic collection and topic organization and restrictive planning is mostly performed during realization. Restrictive planning is implement e d i n P AULINE in the following way: None of the program's rhetorical goals are ever fully achieved and ushed; they require decisions to be made in their favor throughout the text. PAULINE simply tallies the number of times each s u c h goal is satised by the selection of some option (of course, a single item may help satisfy a n umber of goals simultaneously). For conict resolution, PAULINE uses the least-satised strategy, convince relate describe based on the lowest total satisfaction status. In order to do this, it must know which goals each option will help satisfy. Responsibility for providing this information lies with whatever produces the option: either the lexicon or the language specialist functions in the grammar.
Input Topics
Topic Collection { topic collection:
Topic Organization { i n terpretation { new topics { juxtaposition { ordering Realization { s e n tence type { organization { constituents { w ords 
Characteristics of Formal Text
Yesterday, December 7, 1941 | a date which w i l l l i v e in infamy | the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by n a val and air forces of the Empire of Japan.
The United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking forward to the maintenance of peace in the Pacic.
Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint o f w ar or armed attack.
It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many d a ys or even weeks ago. During the intervening time, the Japanese PAULINE has the architecture shown in Fig. 1 In language, the level of formality is one of the strongest carriers of non-literal information we use. This level reects the level of formality of the conversational setting (for instance, a burial or a party) and of the interpersonal distance between the interlocutors. But what does it mean for language to \seem relaxed" or to \be formal"? No single item in the language denes the level of formality; rather, text seems to contain a number of little clues that cumulatively create a certain impression. What are these little clues? Where do they appear in language and how d o w e decide to use them?
As discussed in Section 2.4, handbooks of writing are of little use to answer this question. A more useful approach is to describe styles in terms of the decisions a generator has to make: decisions such as sentence content, sentence constituent order and content, and word selection.
All human language users have rules for making their text more or less formal. The desired level of textual formality comes into play along the whole range of generator decisions (from the initial sentence topic selection and organization down to the nal word selection). The best way to illustrate these rules is to dissect a piece of text: What characteristics make this address formal? Certainly, one factor is the use of formal verbs and nouns instead of more common ones, such as \solicitation" instead of \request". Another factor is the use of full names and titles instead of their common abbreviations. Accordingly, one can replace words and phrases in the address by less formal equivalents ((a) below) and use the everyday names for entities (b).
The result, however, is denitely not informal. The sentences still seem long and involved. In order to simplify them, one can (c) remove conjunctions and multi-predicate phrases, and (d) remove adverbial groups, or place them toward the ends of sentences. Now, however, the text seems odd; for example, phrases such as \it will be recorded" do not blend with phrases such as \deliberately tried to cheat" (introduced by (a)). To i m p r o ve this, (e) eliminate the use of passive v oice, and (f) refer to the involved parties | speaker, hearer, and others | directly. Now some phrases sound owery and out of place. To simplify, some nominalized verbs can be converted to verbs (g); noun groups can be simplied by dropping redundant adjectives and nouns (h); pronominalization can be increased (i). Finally, a few nishing touches: simplied tenses (j); colloquial phrases (k); complete elision of redundant w ords where grammatical (l). The result, while not yet exactly street slang, is much less formal:
A n umber of texts, ranging from politicians' speeches and writings to discussions with friends, were analyzed in the manner above. The transformation steps were stated as rules that provide criteria by which P AULINE makes appropriate choices at decision points (more details appear in [Hovy 87]). One of the program's rhetorical goals, the goal controlling formality, t a k es one of the values . In order to make text more formal, the program examines its options at decision points and applies the strategies paraphrased as follows: to make long sentences, select options that contain causal, temporal, or other relations to other sentence topics to make complex sentences, select options that are subordinated in relative clauses; that conjoin two or more sentence topics; that are juxtaposed into relations and multipredicate enhancer and mitigator phrases make sentence seem weighty b y including many a d v erbial groups; by placing these groups toward the beginnings of sentences; by building parallel clauses within sentences; by using passive v oice; by using more \complex" tenses such as the perfect tenses; by avoiding ellipsis, even though it may be grammatical (such as \Joe got more than Pete [did]", \When [I was] 20 years old, I got married") make w eighty, formal noun groups, by including many adjectives and adjectival groups in noun groups; by doubling nouns in noun groups (\Government and Emperor", \statements and expressions"); by including many adverbs and stress words in predicates; by using long, formal phrases; by nominalizing verbs and adverbs (\their ight circled the tree" instead of \they ew round the tree"); by pronominalizing where possible; by not referring directly to the interlocutors or the setting select formal phrases and words; avoid doubtful grammar, slang, and contractions (say \man" rather than \guy" and \cannot" rather than \can't")
In contrast, by following inverted strategies, PAULINE makes its text less formal.
Knowing how t o m a k e formal text is not enough. The generator must also know when it is appropriate. Since the level of formality is not actually measurable, it is most apparent only when the level is suddenly changed or is inappropriate. In order to determine the pragmatic eects of formality, then, the important question is:
First, since formality in language mirrors interpersonal distance between speaker and hearer, when your language becomes less formal you signal a perceived or desired decrease in distance. Which interpersonal distance corresponds to which l e v el of formality and how the correspondence is signaled depends, of course, on social convention and on the interlocutors and their relationship. See [Brown and Levinson 78] Second, if you alter the level of textual formality, y ou may perturb the tone or atmosphere of the conversation. Since the conversational atmosphere is also mirrored by textual formality, a serious conversation (a burial speech or a conference talk) requires more formality t h a n a n e v eryday conversation (a report to the family of the day's events PAULINE uses these rules to produce the two s h a n tytown texts in Table 1 Simply put, given a sentence topic, the generator's task is to nd a form of expression | either a syntactic rule or a phrase | that will enable it to select and to order aspects of the topic in order to build a s e n tence. The straightforward approach is to dene a xed correspondence between topic representation types on the one hand and grammatical rules and lexical elements on the other. This approach h a s a a w: the results are invariably bad or boring. How bad, of course, depends on the representation, but anything detailed enough to be useful for other purposes, such as learning or diagnosing, simply does not make great prose in practice. A good example is furnished by the following text, in which the generator's input consists of a list of topics, where each topic describes some episode in a ght b e t ween two people . Straightforward generation (by P AULINE, using a simplied grammar) produces:
(a) (The input was produced by Bain's JUDGE program ([4] , [5] ), a case-based expert system that models the sentencing behavior of a judge. As input, JUDGE accepts the representation of a ght | a set of actions and resulting states | and as output it produces a set of interpretations of each action.) This example is an extreme case because it contains only two main representation types, ACTION and STATE, which can relate in only one way, RESULT. When the generator knows only one way to express this combination, what more can one hope for?
Correcting this inexibility seems straightforward. Though there is nothing wrong with the sentence form used above, namely,
] one can add to the grammar a few more sentence forms expressing actions and their results, more time words, and more verbs, and then make the generator cycle through its options whenever it encounters a c hoice point:
Yet this produces no real improvement! Clearly, simply extending the number of phrase patterns for each representation type does not solve the problem. When we s p e a k , w e do a lot more than simply cast input topics in dierent forms; for example, we might s a y: Illustrated this way, the problem seems rather simple. Obviously, the solution is to group together similar enough topics, where the similarity criterion can be varied depending on external factors, and then to generate the groupings instead of the individual actions. Grouping together contiguous actions of similar force, PAULINE produced variants (c), (d), and (e). (In the rst variant, all actions were grouped together; in the second, all actions more violent than bumping but less violent than killing were accepted; and in the third, the grouping resulted from dening four levels of violence: bumping, hitting and slapping, knocking to the ground, and killing.)
Clearly, though it improves the JUDGE examples, the technique of grouping actions by l e v els of force is very specic and not very useful. However, when \group" is used in a wider sense to mean \interpret", this technique becomes both dicult and interesting, and provides a very powerful way to increase the expressive exibility and text quality of a generator. So the questions are: what interpretation/grouping criteria are general and still useful? When and how should the generator interpret input topics? How should it nd appropriate grouping criteria?
In a second example, PAULINE produces a number of versions describing a hypothetical primary election between Carter and Kennedy during the 1980 Democratic Presidential nomination race. In the election, Kennedy narrows Carter's lead. The underlying representation comprises about 80 distinct units. When PAU L I N E i s g i v en as input the outcome for each candidate, straightforward generation produces:
However, PAULINE can notice that both outcomes relate to the same primary, and can say instead: (g) (or any o f a n umber of similar s e n tences using \beat", \win", and \lose"). But why stop there? If PAULINE examines the input further, it can notice that Carter's current delegate count is greater than Kennedy's, that this was also the case before the primary, and that this primary is part of a series that culminates in the nal election, the nomination. In other words, PAULINE can recognize that what happened in this primary was: If we w ant good text from our generators, we h a ve t o g i v e them the ability to recognize that \beat" or \lose" or \narrow lead" can be used instead of only the straightforward sentences (f).
This ability is more than a simple grouping of the two outcomes. It is an act of generator-directed inference, of interpretation, forming out of the two topics a new topic, perhaps one that does not even exist in memory yet. And the new topic is not simply a generator construct, but is a valid concept in memory. The act of determining that \beat" is appropriate the act of interpreting the input as an instance of BEAT | denying this is to imply that \beat" can logically be used where BEAT i s n o t appropriate, which i s a c o n tradiction. This is not an obvious point; one could hold that the task of nding \beat" to satisfy a syntactic or pragmatic goal is a legitimate generator function, whereas the task of instantiating it and incorporating it into memory is not. However, it is clearly inecient for a generator to interpret its input, say it, and then simply forget it again! | especially when there is no principled reason why generator inferences should be distinct from other memory processes.
Thus, after interpretation, the newly built instance of the concept should be added to the story representation, where it can also be used by other processes, or by the generator the next time it tells the story. I n t h i s w ay the content of memory can change as a result of generation. This is consistent with the fact that you often understand a topic better after you have told someone about it: the act of generating has caused you to make explicit and to remember some information you didn't have before.
Immediately, this view poses the question: The two possible positions on this issue reect the amount o f w ork one expects the generator to do. According to the strict minimalist position | a position held by most, if not all, generator builders today | the generator's responsibility is to produce text that faithfully mirrors the input topics with minimal deviation: each s e n tence-level input topic produces a distinct output sentence (though perhaps conjoined with or subordinated to another). This inexible attitude gave rise to the JUDGE texts (a) and (b). To circumvent this problem, in practice, most generator builders employ in their programs a n umber of special-purpose techniques, such as sophisticated sentence specialists that are sensitive t o the subsequent input topics. This is a tacit acknowledgment that the strict position does not hold. However, on renouncing the hard-line position, one must face the question I d o n o t b e l i e v e that a simple answer can be given to this question. The issue here is economic: a tradeo exists between the time and eort required to do interpretation (which includes nding candidate interpretations, making them, and deciding on one) on the one hand, and the importance of owing, good text on the other. Greater expense in time and eort produces better text. Thus pragmatic criteria are appropriate for treating this question. Hence a reasonable answer is . Of these three factors, the most dicult is clearly the pragmatic constraints on what the hearer is to be told. When does the hearer need to know the details of the topic? What is the eect of saying only interpretations? Or of saying both? The answer can be summarized as: if you can trust the hearer to make t h e i n terpretations himself, then all you need say are the details. Thus, if the hearer is a political pundit who is following the nomination race with interest, then clearly (f) is better, since he or she can draw the conclusion without diculty, and, in addition, now has precise numerical information. speaker-hearer depth of acquaintance speaker-hearer relative social status desired eect on hearer's emotion toward speaker desired eect on interpersonal distance desired eect on hearer's emotional state has only minimal knowledge about or interest in the nomination procedure, then (h) is better, since it removes the burden of details and the task of doing the interpretation. What must you say, h o wever, if the hearer is interested and has a limited amount o f k n o wledge | say, h e o r s h e i s a s t u d e n t of the political process | or is knowledgeable but unlikely to make the right i n terpretation | say, he or she is a strong Kennedy supporter, whereas you are pro-Carter? In both these cases you must ensure that the hearer understands how y ou expect him or her to interpret the facts. So you give the details the interpretations:
These considerations can be stated as rules, using the terms dened above t o c haracterize the pragmatic aspects of conversations and the goals of speakers). PAULINE uses these rules to activate the rhetorical goal that controls the level of detail of topics generated. The goal takes one of the values (both details and interpretations):
set the goal's value to if the hearer is likely to understand the details or wants to hear the details. This rule bears on information about the hearer: is the marked ; o r i s t h e marked ?
otherwise, set it to if the hearer is likely to make the wrong interpretations of the details, that is, when the is marked or ; the is not marked ; and the hearer's sympathies and antipathies for the central topic of the conversation are not the opposite of the speaker's otherwise, set it to In addition to these considerations, the value of the goal can be aected by the desire not to upset the hearer: then, set the value to if it is better to avoid painful topics, to ensure that painful aspects (the details, the interpretation, or the inferences used to make it) can simply be left out. This rule translates as follows: is marked , o r is marked , o r i s marked , o r i s marked , o r i s marked ?
In summary, y ou must be as specic as the hearer's knowledge of the topic allows: if you are too specic he or she won't understand, and if you are too general you run the risk of seeming to hide things, or of being uncooperative. In the rst case, you violate the goal to be intelligible, and in the second, you violate the goal to avoid unacceptable implications. In either case, you violate Grice's maxim of quantity t o s a y neither more nor less than is required (see [Grice 75] ).
In order to interpret the input topics as instances of some concept, the interpretation process must recognize when the topics (or some of them) conform to the denition (or part of the denition) of the 24 bottom-up top-down only ; ?X is someone's CONTEST-OUTCOME in some contest ?Y, (CONTEST-OUTCOME ?X (instance (ELECTION ?Y)) ; and it is greater than another CONTEST-OUTCOME in ?Y (relations (REL-GREATER () (conc1 (?X)) (conc2 (CONTEST-OUTCOME () (instance (?Y)))))))
concept. Thus, either concepts must be dened in such a w ay a s t o a l l o w their denitions to be read, or inferences must exist that re when a denition is matched | in other words, where the antecedent of an inference is the denition and the consequent asserts the existence of the new concept.
PAULINE was implemented with the second approach, using patterns called congurations (more details can be found in [Hovy 87]). A conguration is the description of the way i n w h i c h a collection of concepts must relate to one other to form a legitimate instance of a high-level concept. For example, the conguration matching the concept BEAT i s which means: some concept is a CONTEST-OUTCOME; its aspect RELATIONS contains a GREATER relation, of which the greater part is that same concept and the smaller part is another CONTEST-OUTCOME in the same primary. T h us, since Kennedy's outcome resulted from a primary and it is greater than Carter's outcome, the two form an instance of BEATing.
For the Carter-Kennedy and shantytown examples, PAULINE has 14 congurations beside BEAT, all considerably more complex. These conguration patterns obviously depend on the exact representations used. A more sophisticated implementation of this idea would use an automatic classier system such as the KL-ONE classier (see [Schmolze and Lipkis 83] ).
The problem in interpretation is to nd valid interpretations easily and quickly. This can be done in two w ays.
One solution to this problem is to run interpretation inferences directly on the input topics. In this method of interpretation, inferences reside in memory and the lexicon, linked to denitions of concept types. (This scheme forms a concept representation network slightly different from the usual multi-parent s c hemes used in, say, [Stek and Bobrow 8 6 , Charniak et al. 80, Bobrow and Winograd 77] ). From the type of each input topic, the program collects and runs inferences, collects the results. This is not a wonderful solution | it depends on the right links being dened beforehand | but it is practical in limited domains.
Another way to nd interpretations is
: potentially useful inferences can be explicitly included in plans that serve the generator's pragmatic goals, and can be tried on candidate sentence topics. Since interpretation is a powerful way of slanting the text, the pragmatic goals to communicate opinions (see Section 6) are an eminently suitable source of guidance. Indeed, many of these goals can be achieved through interpreting the input topics appropriately.
During its planning stage, PAULINE gathers likely interpretation inferences, both top-down and bottom-up, and then, using a simple pattern-matcher, applies their congurations to the candidate topics and collects all the matches. Its strategies for selecting congurations are based upon the pragmatic factors knowledge, slant, and time, described above. If an instance of a newly made interpretation does not yet exist in memory, P AULINE creates one and indexes it following the memory organization principles described in [Schank 82 ], so that it can be found again and used in future.
For example, when generating the shantytown text with the goal to slant the input, PAULINE uses top-down inferences to interpret the input topics appropriately (see the section on partiality b e l o w for more details):
, and (d), none of which w ere contained in the original input story.
As generators become larger and more complex, and as they are increasingly used together with other programs, they should use the capabilities of those programs to further their own ends. Therefore, we should study the kinds of tasks that generators share with other processes and the purposes generators require them to fulll. The strategies described here embody some of the kinds of demands a generator can be expected to place on a general-purpose inference engine. And even with PAULINE's limited inferential capability, the program can greatly enhance the quality of its text and the eciency of its communication of non-literal pragmatic information.
Much language is devoted to the communication of opinions. Such communication is often implicit; our biases sneak into what we s a y so easily and so often that producing genuinely unslanted text can be quite dicult! For example, compare the rst two sentences from the protester and university texts in Clearly, the protester had a reason for saying \concerned" where the university speaker said \a small group of"; also, the latter wanted to imply something specic with \took over"; and even the dierent names used for the location (Boesak Plaza and Beinecke Plaza, the ocial name) and for the university (\Yale" and \those in Woodbridge Hall", which is the president's oce) have dierent connotations. These dierences are not haphazard; each s p e a k er made the decisions that slanted the text in his or her favor. What are these decisions? When and how are they made?
In order to slant the text to t the hearer's opinions, the speaker must be able to determine what the hearer is likely to nd sympathetic, what he or she is likely to dislike, and what he or she is likely not to care about much. PAULINE uses three values of aect: GOOD, BAD, and NEUTRAL. (Of course, here simply denotes something akin to \like". But even with this limited denotation, three values are sucient t o g i v e the program interesting behavior. In this regard it is similar to the work on narrative summarization in [Lehnert 82 ].) PAULINE's aects derive from two sources: provided by the user and dened as intrinsic to certain representation elements. To give P AULINE opinions, the user must specify one or more representation elements as or as . (In PAULINE, this is simply implemented by h a ving a sympathy and an antipathy list. Elements on these lists will be characterized as GOOD and BAD respectively.) The second source of aect is dened for those generic representation elements that carry some intrinsic aect in the example domain. For example, in neutral context, the concept ARREST is BAD, the university's goal to be reasonable and fair is GOOD, and all other concepts, such a s STUDENTS and CONSTRUCTION, are NEUTRAL.
In order to compute an opinion about any arbitrary piece of input representation, PAULINE has the ability t o c o m bine its given aects and concepts' intrinsic aects and to propagate aect along relations to other concepts. Though their exact form obviously depends on the design of the representation, the basic rules are 1. aect is preserved when combined with NEUTRAL 2. like aects combine to GOOD 3. unlike aects combine to BAD 4. aect inverts when propagated along certain relations (e.g., the of a BAD act is GOOD). A special rule for aect propagation is dened for each s u c h relation.
When should the speaker exhibit partiality? In general, since his or her sympathies and antipathies reect so accurately the speaker's disposition toward the world, any opinion with which the hearer disagrees implies distance between them | perhaps even censure on the part of the speaker. Thus, to simplify, when the speaker's opinion agrees with the hearer's, expressing it will tend to make them closer; when it disagrees, expressing it may cause problems. Furthermore, partiality can be expressed explicitly, using clauses that state the speaker's opinion, or implicitly, using techniques such as phrasal juxtaposition and stress words. The rules PAULINE uses to activate its rhetorical goal of are:
1. set the value of the goal to if the speaker's and hearer's and is marked ; o r is marked ; o r is marked 2. set it to if the speaker's and hearer's and is marked , since being lukewarm about the agreement with the hearer separates them; or is marked , f o r the same reason; or is marked , that is, if the speaker does not want m a k e the hearer too involved in the conversation 3. otherwise, set it to if their , o r i f t h e i r and is marked , is marked , and is marked or , and is marked or , since when the speaker cares about an expert hearer's opinion, he or she will not want to exhibit partiality and lack of knowledge 4. set the value of the goal to if the speaker's and hearer's and is marked ; o r is marked ; o r is marked ; o r is marked 5. otherwise, set it to if their and is marked ; o r is marked ; o r is marked (that is, when the hearer is subordinate to the speaker)
Having determined a value for this goal of partiality, P AULINE uses the following strategies of style that act as criteria at decision points to make text partial (both and ): In contrast, in order to make its text as as possible, the program uses inverse strategies.
As suggested by the abovementioned list, aect can be injected into text by a n umber of dierent slanting techniques. These techniques are either , i n volving judicious topic collection and the biased interpretation of topics, or , i n volving the appropriate juxtaposition of topics in phrases, the use of enhancing and mitigating stress words, and prejudiced word choice.
As input, PAULINE is given one or more initial sentence topics. It uses one of three topic collection plans (the CONVINCE plan, if the goal is not ; the DESCRIBE plan (similar to the schemas described in [McKeown 85]) for objects; and otherwise the RELATE plan) to collect additional topics from the concept representation network. Each step of a topic collection plan tells the generator where in the representation network to nd other potentially useful sentence topics. Applying each step to the input topics, PAULINE gathers additional topics, and, for each of them, activates and runs an appropriate collection plan in turn, thereby doing a depth-rst topic search and collection.
When the hearer shares PAULINE's aect for a topic, there is no problem; the topic can simply be said directly. But when they disagree, the program has to be more careful. The strategy tried in the Carter-Kennedy examples (and described more fully in [Hovy 86]) is :
Say GOOD topics Juxtapose NEUTRAL topics with GOOD ones in enhancer phrases (explained below) Leave out BAD topics altogether, unless they can be mitigated using mitigator phrases and words, or unless they are central to the story Sometimes, however, the program is explicitly given the goal to discuss a sensitive topic. In such cases PAULINE uses the strategy of : s a ying only aspects of topics that support its opinion. The CONVINCE plan, described more fully in [Hovy 85] Consider of the topic with the sensitive aspect | from the concept(s) immediately superior to the topic in the memory network, compute the aects of other, similar instances, and collect those with BAD aect, Consider of the topic with the sensitive aspect | collect all the results and outcomes of the topic (if it is (part of) a goal, a plan, or a script, examine the nal outcomes too) if they are GOOD, Consider of the topic with the sensitive aspect | collect topics in intergoal relations with the topic (e.g., those goals the topic supports, opposes, is a side-eect of) if they are GOOD, Consider of the topic with the sensitive aspect |collect all the side-eects of the topic (if it is a goal or a plan) as far as they are known to be GOOD, | i f a n y of the immediate aspects of the topic refer to people or organizations who share in, have, or support the sensitive aspect, and if the hearer's aect for these authorities is GOOD, collect them (not implemented in PAULINE),
Simply
with the sensitive aspect | just say it and allow subsequent realization decisions to give it the appropriate slant.
In the shantytown example of Table 3 , PAULINE is given three input topics (the building of the shanties, their being taken down, and Yale's permission for them to be rebuilt). When the program has the goal to switch the hearer's opinions to correspond to its own, it activates the CONVINCE topic collection plan. When PAULINE is speaking as a university supporter, the step of the plan causes it to collect, as additional topics, the university's oer of an alternative site for the shanties and the protesters' refusal to move, since these topics are (a) direct results of the building of the shanties and are (b) GOOD from the program's point of view, for they serve the university's goal to be lenient a n d s h o w the protesters' intransigence. When on the other hand it is speaking as protester, the same step causes it to collect the item representing the students' arrest. Other steps of the plan provide other topics. Eventually, h a ving performed the collection, PAULINE begins topic organization Having selected topics to be said, the next problem is to nd suitable forms of expression for them. In certain cases, selections with appropriate biases are easy to make; in the same way that \erect" was dened as a formal version of \build", \tear down" can be dened as a slanted version of \disassemble". However, most slanting techniques require much more information. For example, the phrases \many students" and \a small group of students" are not simply two dierent lexicalizations of an underlying concept. In order to nd when they can be used and which phrases are appropriate the generator requires, at least, limited inferential capability together with rules (special-purpose inferences) that suggest making specic slanting implications.
As described in Section 5, PAULINE has limited inferential capability. It also has a list of rules that prescribe how the generator should proceed to nd forms of expression for input topics with certain characteristics, and that indicate what aspects of these topics can be used to create an appropriate slant. The goals that activate these rules are called the . When the program is given sympathies that oppose the hearer's sympathies, and when the pragmatic value for is , P AULINE activates these goals, which can be paraphrased as:
that our side is good and theirs is bad : (a) they started the whole aair; (b) they coerce others into doing things; (c) they have little support; (d) they don't seem to want a solution; (e) their demands/goals are beyond reasonable expectations; (f) they are only in it for their own good; (g) they are are immoral, unfair; (h) they use distasteful/ugly tactics, misuse their rights, or overstep the bounds of propriety; (i) they disseminate false or misleading information about the dispute; (j) they have a hidden agenda; (k) they won't discuss/negotiate the issue; (l) they won't moderate their stance, are unconciliatory, i n transigent.
These strategies are encoded as top-down interpretation inferences. They re when the input sentence topics have c haracteristics that match their activation conditions; the left-hand sides are patterns he hit ve home runs! IF the current topic is an ACTION, AND its affect is BAD, AND the action serves one of the opponents' goals AND the goal's desire is to have some other party do some act AND the other party's affect is GOOD, THEN imply that the opponents force their will on them (using verbs and phrases such as``force'',``make them do'') IF the current topic claims support (an MTRANS of a SUPPORT), AND the ACTOR's affect is BAD, AND the SUPPORT contains a number of people, THEN minimize that number, by using adjectives such as``a small number'',``a few'' of representation element t ypes and their right-hand sides cause the generator to select the appropriate forms of expression. In somewhat more detail, the inferences and (see Table 3 ) can be paraphrased as (the terms in capitals are elements of the representation language. MTRANS denotes the act of transferring information; PTRANS the act of transferring physical objects, and ATRANS the act of transferring control over something; see [Schank 72] and [Schank and Abelson 77] ): they force their will on others (corresponding to the university s p e a k er's \in order to force"): they claim to have more support than they have (corresponding to the university speaker's adjective \a small number):
Dierent inferences are applied at dierent times in the generation process. This depends on the kinds of eect they have on the processing and is controlled by the grammar. Inferences that call for the candidate topic(s) to be interpreted and completely replaced by other topics (such a s i n terpreting a request as a coercion) are run during the topic organization phase; inferences that suggest appropriate adjectives (\a large number", \a small group") are run when noun groups are built; those that prescribe specic verbs when predicates are constructed.
After it has collected candidate topics and before it says them, given the time and the inclination (controlled by the rhetorical goals of and ), PAU L I N E c a n p e r f o r m a n umber of topic organization tasks, one of which (conjunction) was described above under .
Sentence topics can also be juxtaposed in ways that carry aective implications. Conjunctive patterns such as \not only X but Y" can be used to imply that X and Y carry the same aective v alue, and in fact that the value is to be strengthened due to their juxtaposition. The \not only X but Y" form can be called an . Other enhancing phrases are:
(d) \Pete played the game; , he hit ve home runs" (e) \Pete played the game;
, he hit ve home runs"
When an enhancer phrase juxtaposes two aect-laden sentences, the aect is strengthened; when it juxtaposes an aect-laden sentence with a neutral one, the aect is imputed to the latter. Thus, in addition to stressing aective concepts, a speaker can strengthen his or her case by imputing aect to neutral concepts too! This is, for example, what PAULINE does to produce when defending the university ( s e e T able 3). For PAULINE, the commission visit topic is simply NEU-TRAL, whereas permission to rebuild, because it serves the goal to be reasonable (which i s i n trinsically GOOD) is GOOD. When juxtaposed in this way, sentences seem GOOD for Yale | exactly what PAULINE wants.
Similarly, phrases with weakening eect are . When a mitigator phrase juxtaposes two sentences carrying opposite aect, the resulting aect is that of the rst sentence, weakened; when it juxtaposes an aect-laden sentence with a neutral one, the opposite aect is imputed to the latter. In the following sentences, if \John whipped the dog" carries BAD aect, then, if we k n o w nothing more, \he remembered the cat" becomes GOOD:
(f) \ John remembered the cat, he whipped the dog" (g) \John remembered the cat.
, he whipped the dog"
The rst part, taken by itself, is neutral; it could just as well have been made BAD by using an enhancer:
(h) \ did John remember the cat, he whipped the dog"
In a two-predicate mitigator, the sentence with the desired aect usually appears last.
A n umber of other constraints must be met before two topics can be juxtaposed in an enhancer or mitigator phrase. These are described in [Hovy 86].
The juxtaposition of topics is controlled by the active rhetorical goals of opinion. In the shantytown example, for instance, the program's rst goal is to introduce the topic. Its topic collection strategies provide it with two topics (the shanty construction and the protesters' intention) that are related by a SUBGOAL-TO relation. As at any decision point, the active rhetorical strategies of style are queried: should the relation between the two topics be used to conjoin them into a compound sentence? The answer is , since the relevant topic organization strategy, activated for both and values of , calls for the use of aect-imputing enhancer and mitigator phrases. What is an appropriate way to express a SUBGOAL-TO relation? Here the inferences of opinion come into play, making decisions about the appropriateness of various interpretations of the two topics and their relationship. When sympathetic toward the university, one inference that matches the construction and its goal, which has the desired state that Yale divest from the companies, is that of , described above. This strategy spawns the instruction to say a newly-formed interpretation, CAUSE-TO-DO, with the protesters' intent a s a t t a c hed topic, and the conjunction \in order to force". In contrast, when PAULINE is speaking as a protester, the strategy causes it to join the topics using the phrase \as a reminder to". (When the program has no opinions, it would simply use a neutral phrase such as \in order to" or \so as to".) All these phrases are in the lexicon, indexed in a discrimination net linked to the relation SUBGOAL-TO.
Nouns and verbs often carry aective v alue themselves. The words in PAULINE's lexicon are organized in discrimination nets to provide enhancing and mitigating alternatives when required. For example, the representation primitive MTRANS indexes to, amongst others, the verbs \order", \tell", \ask", and \request"; and DECONSTRUCT to \tear down", \disassemble", and \remove". See Table 3 .
In summary, compare PAULINE's generation of the Carter-Kennedy example under three pragmatically dierent scenarios. In all three cases, the input is the same; the dierences in the text result from the dierent v alues for the active rhetorical goals, which result from the dierent initial pragmatic settings. Only the eects of the rhetorical goals of and will be discussed here (see [Hovy 87 ] for more details).
In
, neither interlocutor has opinions about the topic (causing to be set to ); both have the usual knowledge of the electoral process (making be ); the level of is ; and when the program is given enough time, is activated with the value . The result appears in Table 4 . In , the hearer is a and social (therefore again ) who is not as expert as the sibling (i.e., knowledge level is , which m a k es be ). But now b o t h i n terlocutors have opinions: PAULINE's sympathy is for Kennedy and the hearer's is for Carter (so that is ). The program is given as much time (mainly to make interpretations) as it needs:
is . The result appears in Table 5 .
Finally, i n , P AULINE is a Carter supporter and is speaking to its boss, an irascible Kennedy man. They are making a long-distance telephone call, which gives the program time and makes conversational conditions (activating the goal with the value ). Furthermore, the program is from its boss, does not wish to anger him (desired emotional eect is ), and still wants to make him feel socially (resulting in and for ). But to its boss ( This text came as a surprise. Investigation showed that the lack of time prevented any of the strategies for implicitly stating opinions from being applied: no topic collection plan was activated; no search for mitigating interpretations took place; the lack of a second topic meant no topic juxtaposition was possible; no rhetorical goals of opinion were present to guide mitigating adverb and adjective selection and appropriate word choice. Therefore, the goal to present the topic only in mitigated (implicit opinion) form couldn't be satised, and no sentence could be generated.
The question \why a n d h o w i s i t t h a t w e s a y the same thing in dierent w ays to dierent people, or even to the same person in dierent circumstances?" is interesting from a number of perspectives. From a cognitive perspective, it highlights speakers' goals and personal interrelationships in communication; from a linguistic perspective, it raises interesting questions about the information content of language; and from an engineering-AI perspective, it illustrates the need for principled reasons by w h i c h a program that can realize the same input in various ways can make its selections.
As described in this paper, the answer deals with the pragmatic nature of communication | a big and complex eld of study. In order to begin to study how pragmatics is used in generation, a number of assumptions about plausible types of speaker goals and the relevant c haracteristics of hearers and of conversational settings must be made. The specic pragmatic features used by P AULINE are but a rst step. They are the types of factors that play a role in conversation; no claims are made about their literal veracity. Similarly, the strategies PAULINE uses to link its pragmatic features to the actual generator decisions, being dependent on the denitions of the features, are equally primitive; again, no strong claims are made about their existence in people in exactly the form shown. However, in even such a simple theory as this, certain lessons emerge, and these lessons, I believe, hold true no matter how sophisticated the eventual theory is. The lessons pertain primarily to the organization of pragmatic information in generation: the fact that interpersonal and situational information and goals are too general to be of immediate use; the resulting fact that intermediate strategies, here called rhetorical strategies, are required to guide generation; the fact that, in a model of generation that incorporates these goals, rhetorical planning and realization must be interleaved processes, where the interleaving takes place at the choice points.
The study of language generation by computer has traditionally been divided into two questions:
and The aim of this work is to illustrate the importance of a third question:
If generators do not face up to this question, they will never be able to address the other two satisfactorily.
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